Archive for November 27th, 2022

Crash Dump Analysis Patterns (Part 282)

Sunday, November 27th, 2022

COM Object analysis pattern is similar to C++ Object because of the same binary compatibility (the first object member is a pointer (vptr) to a table of function pointers (vtbl):

0:003> !teb
TEB at 000000c0033d8000
ExceptionList: 0000000000000000
StackBase: 000000c003480000
StackLimit: 000000c00347a000
SubSystemTib: 0000000000000000
FiberData: 0000000000001e00
ArbitraryUserPointer: 0000000000000000
Self: 000000c0033d8000
EnvironmentPointer: 0000000000000000
ClientId: 00000000000012e8 . 00000000000023c8
RpcHandle: 0000000000000000
Tls Storage: 000002a0b8be97f0
PEB Address: 000000c0033d1000
LastErrorValue: 14007
LastStatusValue: c0150008
Count Owned Locks: 0
HardErrorMode: 0

0:003> dpp 000000c00347a000 000000c003480000
[...]
000000c0`0347d698 000000c0`0347d630 00000001`574f454d
000000c0`0347d6a0 000002a0`b3dc36e0 00007ffc`f5f98430 combase!CObjectContext::`vftable’
000000c0`0347d6a8 000002a0`00000000
000000c0`0347d6b0 000000c0`0347d9e8 00000000`00000000
000000c0`0347d6b8 000000c0`0347d7a0 00000000`00260001
000000c0`0347d6c0 000002a0`b8c07050 4b62055c`8a40a45d
000000c0`0347d6c8 000000c0`0347d9b0 000000c0`0347e2c0
000000c0`0347d6d0 000000c0`0347d9b0 000000c0`0347e2c0
000000c0`0347d6d8 00000000`00000010
000000c0`0347d6e0 0000eda0`2ba8550b
000000c0`0347d6e8 000002a0`b8c0cbe0 00007ffc`f5f9bae8 combase!CClientChannel::`vftable’
000000c0`0347d6f0 00000000`00000002
[…]

We have the following chain of memory addresses: 000000c0`0347d6a0 (the address of the object pointer) -> 000002a0`b3dc36e0 (the address of the object allocated from heap) -> 00007ffc`f5f98430 (vptr, the address of the first vtbl entry).

0:003> dps 00007ffc`f5f98430
00007ffc`f5f98430 00007ffc`f5dacd30 combase!CObjectContext::QueryInterface
00007ffc`f5f98438 00007ffc`f5e25120 combase!CObjectContext::AddRef
00007ffc`f5f98440 00007ffc`f5d8e990 combase!CObjectContext::Release
00007ffc`f5f98448 00007ffc`f5e769e0 combase!CObjectContext::SetProperty
00007ffc`f5f98450 00007ffc`f5ef7000 combase!CObjectContext::RemoveProperty
00007ffc`f5f98458 00007ffc`f5dffb00 combase!CObjectContext::GetProperty
00007ffc`f5f98460 00007ffc`f5ef57e0 combase!CObjectContext::EnumContextProps
00007ffc`f5f98468 00007ffc`f5e20e90 combase!CObjectContext::Freeze
00007ffc`f5f98470 00007ffc`f5ef57a0 combase!CObjectContext::DoCallback
00007ffc`f5f98478 00007ffc`f5ef7140 combase!CObjectContext::SetContextMarshaler
00007ffc`f5f98480 00007ffc`f5df7d50 combase!CObjectContext::GetContextMarshaler
00007ffc`f5f98488 00007ffc`f5ef7120 combase!CObjectContext::SetContextFlags
00007ffc`f5f98490 00007ffc`f5ef5340 combase!CObjectContext::ClearContextFlags
00007ffc`f5f98498 00007ffc`f5ef5960 combase!CObjectContext::GetContextFlags
00007ffc`f5f984a0 00007ffc`f5d8e750 combase!CObjectContext::FreezeWithApartmentSet
00007ffc`f5f984a8 00007ffc`f5d9b4c0 combase!CObjectContext::InternalContextCallback

The difference from a traditional C++ object (with virtual functions) layout is that the first 3 functions in vtbl (vftable) are QueryInterface, AddRef, and Release. In a C++ object, there can be an arbitrary number of function pointers with any corresponding symbolic names.

- Dmitry Vostokov @ DumpAnalysis.org + TraceAnalysis.org -

Posted in C and C++, COM Debugging, Crash Dump Analysis, Crash Dump Patterns, x64 Windows | Comments Off

Crash Dump Analysis Patterns (Part 29f)

Sunday, November 27th, 2022

This is High Contention pattern variant for network communication via sockets. Stack Trace Collection or Stack Trace Set may show frames with Winsock API (ws2_32 module) or SPI (WSP prefix, mswsock module) based on these template stack trace frames:

06 000000fa`f96eaa90 00007ffb`998d3e9f mswsock!WSPSend+0x1ce
07 000000fa`f96eab90 00007ffb`8bba1062 ws2_32!send+0x197

0:000> !findstack mswsock!WSP
Thread 008, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000faf4a0d628 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 009, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000faf4b0ca78 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 015, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000faf976bf98 00007ffb998d3e9f mswsock!WSPSend+0x1ce

Thread 021, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000faf96eaa88 00007ffb998d3e9f mswsock!WSPSend+0x1ce

Thread 026, 1 frame(s) match
* 10 000000fafa1eb168 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 043, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000faf8eebe68 00007ffb998d3e9f mswsock!WSPSend+0x1ce

Thread 051, 1 frame(s) match
* 10 000000fafa66bdf8 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 052, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000fafa6ebdb8 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 058, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000fafa9ea908 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 059, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000fafaa6b0e8 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 060, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000fafaaeb3b8 00007ffb998d3e9f mswsock!WSPSend+0x1ce

Thread 064, 1 frame(s) match
* 10 000000fafaceb7d8 00007ffb998d3e9f mswsock!WSPSend+0x1ce

Thread 069, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000fafaf6bfd8 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 073, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000fafb16c798 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 074, 1 frame(s) match
* 06 000000fafb1ec2b8 00007ffb998cffd3 mswsock!WSPSelect+0x4fa

Thread 080, 1 frame(s) match
* 10 000000fafb4eaf38 00007ffb998cf857 mswsock!WSPRecv+0x2ef

Thread 081, 1 frame(s) match
* 10 000000fafb56bd98 00007ffb998d3e9f mswsock!WSPSend+0x1ce

[...]

It is always good to compare the number of such suspicious threads with a normal memory dump.

- Dmitry Vostokov @ DumpAnalysis.org + TraceAnalysis.org -

Posted in Crash Dump Analysis, Crash Dump Patterns, x64 Windows | Comments Off