Software Diagnostics Library

Generative AI LLM models such as GPT-4 are very good at annotation and summarization of memory regions (Region Summaries) with symbolic information and may provide additional insight even without symbolic information (although all such insights should be treated with caution):

Summarize:
0: kd> dpS ffffa7848e4c5000 ffffa7848e4cb000
fffff804`04c0fa78 nt!HalpApicRequestInterrupt+0xd8
fffff804`04d2b18d nt!HalpInterruptSendIpi+0xfd
fffff804`04d091f1 nt!MiAddWorkingSetEntries+0x451
fffff804`04a0f800 nt!MiFreeThenFree
fffff804`04d08aa5 nt!MiAllocateWsle+0x295
fffff804`04d0a520 nt!MiGetPageChain+0xeb0
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`04d07fec nt!MiCompletePrivateZeroFault+0x77c
fffff804`04cd2d1d nt!HalRequestIpiSpecifyVector+0x7d
fffff804`04cd2aa7 nt!KiIpiSendRequest+0x397
fffff804`04d5f66c nt!KiIpiSendRequestEx+0x88
fffff804`04d5f5d1 nt!KxFlushEntireTb+0x1a5
fffff804`04c31710 nt!KiFlushCurrentTbWorker
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`04d5eccd nt!KeFlushTb+0xa1
fffff804`04c65e3e nt!MiFlushEntireTbDueToAttributeChange+0x4a
fffff804`04d0b1c4 nt!MiGetPerfectColorHeadPage+0x94
fffff804`05654f00 nt!PnpSystemHiveTooLarge
fffff804`04c6cfad nt!MiChangePageAttribute+0xed
fffff804`04cf7fc6 nt!MiFlushTbAsNeeded+0x156
fffff804`04d50053 nt!MiGetContainingPageTable+0x43
fffff804`04d4fc5c nt!MiAssignNonPagedPoolPte+0x1ac
fffff804`04c0fa78 nt!HalpApicRequestInterrupt+0xd8
fffff804`04c0fa78 nt!HalpApicRequestInterrupt+0xd8
fffff804`04d2b18d nt!HalpInterruptSendIpi+0xfd
fffff804`04cf86a6 nt!MmAllocatePoolMemory+0xca
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`04c6feeb nt!MiReplenishPageSlist+0x31b
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`04c1356a nt!HalPerformEndOfInterrupt+0x1a
fffff804`05655a00 nt!MiSystemPartition+0xa40
fffff804`04d2ee05 nt!ExReleaseAutoExpandPushLockShared+0x85
fffff804`0960cfde Ntfs!NtfsLookupNtfsMcbEntryWithSyncFlag+0x14e
fffff804`04e1e197 nt!SwapContext+0x1c7
fffff804`056eabd0 nt!KiAbTreeArray+0x52d0
fffff804`04cfb100 nt!KiAbEntryGetLockedHeadEntry+0x2a0
fffff804`04e1dce6 nt!KiSwapContext+0x76
fffff804`04cc0d52 nt!KiCancelTimer+0x262
fffff804`05653500 nt!MiState+0x4480
fffff804`05653500 nt!MiState+0x4480
fffff804`04cdd148 nt!MiReservePtes+0x48
fffff804`09543e42 Wof!WofPostReadCallback+0x72
fffff804`096086a9 Ntfs!NtfsVerifyAndRevertUsaBlock+0x25d
fffff804`0893676f FLTMGR!FltpPerformPostCallbacksWorker+0x3bf
fffff804`04d2ba3b nt!KeQueryCurrentStackInformationEx+0x8b
fffff804`04c0fa78 nt!HalpApicRequestInterrupt+0xd8
fffff804`04d2b18d nt!HalpInterruptSendIpi+0xfd
fffff804`04d2f11f nt!KeSetEvent+0xdf
fffff804`04cc5dc7 nt!IopFreeIrp+0xf7
fffff804`04d34cc7 nt!IofCompleteRequest+0x17
fffff804`09619028 Ntfs!NtfsExtendedCompleteRequestInternal+0x218
fffff804`04d2ee05 nt!ExReleaseAutoExpandPushLockShared+0x85
fffff804`04d0e611 nt!MmCheckCachedPageStates+0x681
fffff804`05659240 nt!MiSystemPartition+0x4280
fffff804`04d0e611 nt!MmCheckCachedPageStates+0x681
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`04d30071 nt!MiUnlockWorkingSetShared+0x81
fffff804`04d2ee05 nt!ExReleaseAutoExpandPushLockShared+0x85
fffff804`04d0e611 nt!MmCheckCachedPageStates+0x681
fffff804`0960feca Ntfs!NtfsCheckMappingPairs+0xea
fffff804`0960cfde Ntfs!NtfsLookupNtfsMcbEntryWithSyncFlag+0x14e
fffff804`04c9b51a nt!SepNormalAccessCheck+0x1fa
fffff804`04d2f11f nt!KeSetEvent+0xdf
fffff804`04d0e611 nt!MmCheckCachedPageStates+0x681
fffff804`04c9ad64 nt!SepAccessCheck+0x304
fffff804`0960fe00 Ntfs!NtfsCheckMappingPairs+0x20
fffff804`054351f8 nt!IopFileMapping
fffff804`04c9a570 nt!SeAccessCheckWithHint+0x640
fffff804`054351f8 nt!IopFileMapping
fffff804`054351f8 nt!IopFileMapping
fffff804`09721fb2 Ntfs!TxfAccessCheck+0x192
fffff804`05163eff nt!CcUnpinData+0x1f
fffff804`054351f8 nt!IopFileMapping
fffff804`04c93842 nt!FsRtlCheckOplockEx2+0x922
fffff804`04d3027b nt!ExReleaseResourceLite+0xeb
fffff804`050f44bb nt!SeUnlockSubjectContext+0x1b
fffff804`0971f872 Ntfs!NtfsAccessCheck+0x11b2
fffff804`04c92f0c nt!FsRtlCheckOplockEx+0x3c
fffff804`09721b48 Ntfs!NtfsOpenAttribute+0x1768
fffff804`0971e585 Ntfs!NtfsCheckExistingFile+0x775
fffff804`096e7a2c Ntfs!NtfsBreakBatchOplock+0xfc
fffff804`0971dce2 Ntfs!NtfsOpenExistingAttr+0x252
fffff804`0971d6cb Ntfs!NtfsOpenAttributeInExistingFile+0xcbb
fffff804`04d2dae9 nt!FsRtlLookupPerStreamContextInternal+0x1a9
fffff804`04d2ee05 nt!ExReleaseAutoExpandPushLockShared+0x85
fffff804`08934f4e FLTMGR!FltGetStreamContext+0xce
fffff804`095637c6 Wof!WofPostCleanupCallback+0xa6
fffff804`0893676f FLTMGR!FltpPerformPostCallbacksWorker+0x3bf
fffff804`04d302d6 nt!ExReleaseResourceLite+0x146
fffff804`05157ff1 nt!HvpGetCellContextInitialize+0x15
fffff804`051580aa nt!HvpMapEntryGetBlockAddress+0xe
fffff804`05157fcf nt!HvpReleaseCellPaged+0x2f
fffff804`05158072 nt!HvpGetCellPaged+0x72
fffff804`05157ff1 nt!HvpGetCellContextInitialize+0x15
fffff804`0515be21 nt!CmpCompareInIndex+0x211
fffff804`05157fcf nt!HvpReleaseCellPaged+0x2f
fffff804`04cc684c nt!KiSetAddressPolicy+0xc
fffff804`04cc6b6d nt!KiStackAttachProcess+0x24d
fffff804`04d2cd97 nt!wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToServiceDirect+0xd7
fffff804`05157ff1 nt!HvpGetCellContextInitialize+0x15
fffff804`05157fcf nt!HvpReleaseCellPaged+0x2f
fffff804`04cc684c nt!KiSetAddressPolicy+0xc
fffff804`04c842f7 nt!wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToService+0x37
fffff804`04cc6de5 nt!KiSwapProcess+0x75
fffff804`04cc6faa nt!KiUnstackDetachProcess+0x17a
fffff804`054b132b nt!CmpDetachFromRegistryProcess+0xb
fffff804`0517eee1 nt!CmpDoParseKey+0x2f11
fffff804`096e8d01 Ntfs!NtfsCompleteCleanupRequest+0x51
fffff804`04d40000 nt!MiFreeWsleList+0x130
fffff804`05654fc0 nt!MiSystemPartition
fffff804`095e71be WdFilter+0x571be
fffff804`095c8c5f WdFilter+0x38c5f
fffff804`04d2cd97 nt!wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToServiceDirect+0xd7
fffff804`051b1ac1 nt!VrpRegistryCallback+0xc1
fffff804`0517f9c5 nt!CmpCallCallBacksEx+0x3f5
fffff804`04d2ce3f nt!CmpIsRegistryLockAcquired+0x2f
fffff804`0517bd15 nt!CmpParseKey+0x445
fffff804`04d28a55 nt!MiFastLockLeafPageTable+0x175
fffff804`04d24578 nt!MiGetPageProtection+0x408
fffff804`04d23a2e nt!MiQueryAddressState+0x6ee
fffff804`095e0000 WdFilter+0x50000
fffff804`04d1abe6 nt!MiQueryAddressSpan+0x1e6
fffff804`04d1a862 nt!MiUnlockAndDereferenceVadShared+0x62
fffff804`0517785c nt!MmQueryVirtualMemory+0x6bc
fffff804`0896d280 FLTMGR!FltpFastIoWrite+0x190
fffff804`0516dfc1 nt!ObpReferenceObjectByHandleWithTag+0x231
fffff804`0516dd41 nt!ObReferenceObjectByHandleWithTag+0x31
fffff804`0516ac7b nt!ObWaitForSingleObject+0xdb
fffff804`0516ab8a nt!NtWaitForSingleObject+0x6a
fffff804`04e28775 nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x25
00007ffe`4d2637d4 ntdll!NtWaitForSingleObject+0x14

This output appears to be from the dpS (display words and symbols) debugger command, which is listing memory contents and associated symbols within a specified range (from ffffa7848e4c5000 to ffffa7848e4cb000). The listing shows addresses in memory alongside their corresponding symbol names, indicating various kernel and system functions being referenced in this memory range.

• Functions from nt! (the NT kernel) dominate the list, suggesting this memory range is heavily involved in core operating system operations. This includes interrupt handling (HalpApicRequestInterrupt), memory management (MiAllocateWsle, MiGetPageChain), process and thread management (KiSwapProcess, KiUnstackDetachProcess), and others.
• Specific actions related to memory management and page table entries are frequent, such as MiFlushEntireTbDueToAttributeChange, indicating operations that involve modifying the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) as part of memory attribute changes.
• There are references to file system operations and filter manager functions (e.g., Ntfs!NtfsOpenAttribute, FLTMGR!FltpPerformPostCallbacksWorker), pointing to disk I/O and file system activities within this memory range.
• Several entries related to security and access control (e.g., SepAccessCheck, SeAccessCheckWithHint), showing that some operations in this range involve security checks.
• The presence of symbols like WdFilter suggests Windows Defender operations, possibly indicating anti-malware activities happening or logged within this memory segment.
• The repeated appearance of certain base addresses (MiSystemPartition) and operations (e.g., ExReleaseAutoExpandPushLockShared, KeSetEvent) highlights system-level management tasks, including synchronization and event signaling.
• Additionally, there are references to Registry operations (e.g., CmpCallCallBacksEx, CmpParseKey), indicating some part of this memory is used for Registry access and manipulation.

Overall, the memory range contains a mix of low-level kernel operations, security checks, file system interactions, and system state management tasks, reflecting the complex and interwoven nature of operating system activities. This kind of data is typically used for deep debugging and analysis of system behavior, performance tuning, or troubleshooting specific issues.

Explain:
0: kd> dpp rsp
00000033`d2d7c1d8 00007ffe`1c9e705c 78c08500`00441f0f
00000033`d2d7c1e0 00007ffe`1ca0e818 00000000`00666544
00000033`d2d7c1e8 00000000`00001434
00000033`d2d7c1f0 0000015f`3fed7680 6f46203a`6c707041
00000033`d2d7c1f8 00007ffe`1ca07bea ccccccc3`28c48348
00000033`d2d7c200 00000000`000023b4
00000033`d2d7c208 0000015f`3db4c7b0 00000073`006c0043
00000033`d2d7c210 00000000`00000000
00000033`d2d7c218 00000000`00000000
00000033`d2d7c220 00000033`d2d7c2c8 00000000`04000000
00000033`d2d7c228 00007ffe`1ca02fb6 00000218`36ac8946
00000033`d2d7c230 00000033`d2d7c2c8 00000000`04000000
00000033`d2d7c238 00000000`00000000
00000033`d2d7c240 00007ffe`1ca1578c 00000000`00530025
00000033`d2d7c248 00007ffe`1ba95124 63656e6f`00000044
00000033`d2d7c250 00000000`00000000

The dpp command in the Windows Debugger (WinDbg) displays memory contents at the address specified by the stack pointer register (rsp) and attempts to resolve any pointers to their symbolic names, essentially showing a double word pointer list from the specified location.

Here’s a breakdown of the information provided by the output:

• Each line shows two memory addresses. The left side shows the address being inspected, and the right side shows the content at that address, which may be a value or a pointer to another memory location. If the content is a pointer and a symbol is available, it will show the symbol name next to it.
• For instance, the first line shows the memory address 00000033d2d7c1d8 contains the pointer 00007ffe1c9e705c, which doesn’t have an associated symbolic name provided in this snippet. This could be a function pointer, object pointer, or data pointer depending on the context which isn’t fully given here.
• The output includes pointers to various memory locations, and some lines display what appears to be function pointers (e.g., 00007ffe1c9e705c) and possibly some constants or flags right next to them (e.g., 78c08500`00441f0f). Without more context or symbol information, it’s difficult to specify exactly what each value represents.
• The snippet mentions several pointers that seem related to executable modules (indicated by the 7ffe segment in the addresses, which is common for user-mode addresses on a 64-bit system). These could point to functions or data structures within those modules.
• Addresses like 0000015f3fed7680 or 0000015f3db4c7b0 appear to be heap or dynamically allocated memory addresses due to their range, which differs from the typical ranges used for executable modules or stack memory.

Without the full context, such as the associated source code, loaded modules list, or symbols, it’s challenging to derive a meaningful interpretation of what each pointer or value represents in this scenario. Typically, this command is used by developers or analysts to inspect the call stack, arguments to functions, or specific data structures in memory during debugging sessions to understand the state of an application or diagnose issues.

Please note, symbolic addresses may be Coincidental. Raw stack regions may also be treated as Rough Stack Trace with the corresponding Annotated Stack Traces.

- Dmitry Vostokov @ DumpAnalysis.org + TraceAnalysis.org -

This entry was posted on Monday, March 18th, 2024 at 12:13 pm and is filed under Crash Dump Analysis, Crash Dump Patterns, Generative AI, x64 Windows. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can skip to the end and leave a response. Pinging is currently not allowed.